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The history of Children Centres is well documented with their roots traced to the Head Start 
programme developed in the United States to support low income families. The latest wave 
of Children’s Centres developed out of the Sure Start Local Programmes of the late 1990s, 
provided targeted services for the most deprived and disadvantaged areas in the United 
Kingdom (Lewis, 2011). Children’s Centres in the English context are ‘service hubs run by a 
combination of state maintained and voluntary providers’ (Oberhuemer et al., 2010:457). 
These hubs were designed to offer services for locally defined needs of communities to 
ensure a better start, a sure(r) start for children and support for the families to achieve this. 
The principles of operation were based on those of the Sure Start Local Programmes which 
aimed ‘to involve parents; to avoid stigma; to ensure lasting support for children and families; 
to act in culturally appropriate and sensitive ways; to achieve specific objectives; and to 
promote accessibility for all local families’ (Lewis, 2011:76).  
This chapter: 
• explores the history, development and decline of Children’s Centres as a universal 
service  
• examines how Children’s Centres are socially constructed and how they are viewed 
by the stakeholders 
• outlines how the Children’s Centre mode of operation changed from a core offer to a 
core purpose, due to policy change, and the impact it had on families and the 
community 
• proposes what the ‘real’ future potentially looks like for the families and communities 
of Children’s Centres.  
 
Introduction to a Brief History of Children’s Centres 
In the English context, the establishment of the Sure Start Unit in 1998 and Sure Start Local 
Programmes (SSSLPs) provided the seed bed from which Children’s Centres would grow. By 
2002 the idea of Children’s Centres was being discussed in government (Lewis, 2011) and a 
change of policy direction by the government saw the Sure Start Local Programmes change 
which heralded the birth of Children’s Centres (Bouchel & Norris, 2013).  In 2003, 
Children’s Centres were launched along with a guidance for their core offer of services. The 
aim was to establish 3500 Children’s Centres by 2010, providing a Children’s Centre in every 
community, starting with communities in the areas of significant deprivation.  Children’s 
Centres were also identified in the English Government’s Ten Year Childcare Strategy to 
play a key role in providing high quality childcare services that were available and accessible 
for young children and their families in the community.  Children Centres across the country 
were implemented in three phases, which will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent 
section of this chapter.  
 
In 2010 a coalition government of the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties took power 
in the United Kingdom. The new government heralded a period of financial austerity that 
continued with the election of a Conservative government post 2015. The effects of financial 
austerity were felt across the spectrum of public services. Local Authorities (LAs) faced 
increased financial pressure with a reduction in grants from central government. This filtered 
down to a range of locally provided services including Children’s Centres who experienced 
cuts to their budgets, resources and resulted in the process of phased closure. With the 
reduced financial support, Children’s Centres were forced to move away from a core offer of 
services to having a core purpose. This signifies the beginning of the decline of Children 
Centres. 
 
The core offer was a universal approach to service provision for children and families. 
Integrated full-day childcare and early learning was additionally provided by Children’s 
Centres located in the thirty percent most deprived communities in England described as a 
full core offer of services. Ten years later, in April 2013, the revised core purpose of 
Children’s Centres was revealed which aimed to ‘improve outcomes for young children and 
their families and reduce inequalities between families in greatest need and their peers in: 
child development and school readiness, parenting aspirations and parenting skill and child 
and family health and life chances’ (Department for Education, 2013:7). 
 
This new direction for Children’s Centres saw a move away from universal provision to a 
more targeted model of services and would focus on the most vulnerable and ‘neediest’ 
families in the community. The government also ‘downplayed their role as a universal 
service’ (National Children’s Bureau, 2013:7). The impact of the new core purpose on the 
children and families appeared to be clear starting with the erosion of universal services such 
as ‘stay and play’ sessions or day care provision. In 2009 there were 50,600 children 
registered for full day care in Children’s Centres, by 2013 this had reduced to 24,800 
(Department for Education, 2014).  For a brief moment in time, under the core offer, 
Children’s Centres were bringing the community together to ‘raise the child’. This may seem 
like an idealistic perspective but the potential and the intentions were there right at the start.   
 
From Core Offer to Core Purpose 
The Children’s Centres core offer became established in phase one centres between 2004 and 
2006. The phase one centres, which were effectively Sure Start Local Programmes, 
consolidated and rebranded. The core offer was established to define the services Children’s 
Centres had to provide which consisted of:  
 
drop-in sessions and activities for parents, carers and children, access to child and 
family health services including antenatal care, outreach and family support services, 
links with Jobcentre Plus for training and employment advice, support for child-
minders and support for children and parents with special needs.  
                                                            (National Audit Office, 2009:7)                                                                                                                                    
 
This was a key moment in the development of Children’s Centres with a framework of 
universal provision in place for children and families. The only variance to this universality 
was the provision of a full core offer which gave integrated full-day childcare and early 
learning provision for the thirty per cent most deprived communities in England. The 
definition of deprivation was established by the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) and the 
aim was ‘to reach the most disadvantaged, hard to reach parents’ (Lewis, 2011:75). The 
government’s rationale for this approach came from a desire to reduce the number of 
workless households in these areas which were, per capita, some of the highest in the 
European Union (EU).  
 
Phase two from 2006 to 2008 saw Children’s Centres and the full core offer reach areas of 
the lowest 30% in deprivation not covered by the phase one roll out. In addition the 
Children’s Centres and the core offer reached what were sometimes described as mixed areas, 
communities that had a blend of deprivation and affluence. Phase three rolled out between 
2008 and 2010 and the core offer reached the more affluent communities.  On paper, this 
arguably was the start of a golden age of Children’s Centres with the development of services 
supported by an ‘anything is possible’ attitude. In their communities, Children’s Centres had 
the opportunity to ‘raise the child’ and some centres and Local Authorities grabbed this with 
both hands. Local services were being joined up providing effective integration of health, 
social and education provision and expertise. The impact on communities could be suggested 
to be tangible.  
 
Centres were providing a range of services including advice and support for parents in 
developing the skills needed to raise their children. Centres were supporting teenage mums, 
running father’s groups, there was literacy support for parents together with their children, 
often run in collaboration with local libraries. Health and healthy living support was provided 
through advice, health visitor drop-ins and practical projects such as developing families’ 
cooking skills. Support was available for a range of issues including those experiencing 
domestic abuse or had issues with housing and benefits. Some of these activities positively 
influence the educational climate for families at home and by implications better outcomes 
for children. There was some enhancement of social networks in the community. In essence 
Children’s Centres were being woven into the fabric of communities and strengthened them.  
 
 
Centres were also able to increase the strength of communities by enhancing the skills of the 
individuals such as with employability and Job Centre Plus. This typically occurred through a 
reciprocal relationship between centres and the families and communities who accessed them. 
The idea was that when families and communities engaged in collaborative working with a 
number of professionals for a common goal, it increased social responsibility, community 
cohesion, therefore, improved life outcomes for their children. This developed the image of 
the Children’s Centres as a community resources, a ‘hub’ for signposting and support. This, 
again, was good for community cohesion and served as a potential investment in the future. 
 
Vignette 
Linda was a mother of four children. Linda had experienced domestic abuse and her children 
were sexually abused by her ex-husband. When the abuse of the children was discovered by 
Social Services Linda’s children were removed from her and her ex-husband prosecuted and 
jailed. Linda was initially under suspicion because she had not reported the abuse of her 
children herself. Linda was found to have a learning disability and was subject to domestic 
abuse including physical, mental and sexual abuse from her ex-husband which had left her 
frightened for her own life and she dared not speak about what was happening. Social 
Services asked Linda’s local Children’s Centre to provide support which they did. Through 
the centre Linda received professional counselling, access to the Freedom Programme, 
parenting, life skills and vocational training, eventually working as a centre volunteer. Over 
a two year period with the centres continued support, Linda was able to regain custody of all 
four of her children, the youngest being the last one to return. Linda eventually gained part 
time employment and continued to care for her children. 
 
A major challenge, which is theoretically still ongoing, was to get the balance right between 
the health, education and the social needs of children and communities. This challenge was 
made more difficult because of the barriers that Centres needed to overcome. These included 
the need to establish effective service level agreements between different agencies, 
information sharing protocols, the embedding or co-location of multi-professional and/or 
multi-agency workforces in Children’s Centres. For example, one configuration of this could 
be Children’s Centre family support workers, health visitors, community midwives and Job 
Centre Plus employees.  
 
The change of government in 2010 brought with it constraints on the public budget as 
identified earlier. Just after the general election in 2010 the Coalition Agreement was 
published, which included an outline of plans that wanted Sure Start to have an increasing 
focus on the neediest families (Bate and Forster, 2015). The coalition’s promise to continue to 
fund and prioritise Children’s Centres appeared to be empty. This resulted in a drop in the 
number of Children’s Centres, down to 2,816 centres open in December 2014 from a high of 
3,631 in 2010 (House of Commons Education Committee, 2015).  They were either closing 
down or merging.  
 
An increased focus on the neediest families was realised in 2012, which resulted in the shift 
from Children’s Centres having a core offer of provision to having a core purpose 
(Department for Education, 2013). This led to a more targeted intervention based approach. 
Potential consequences of reducing services for all to targeted services for some included: 
families in genuine need but not meeting threshold criteria for engagement falling off the 
radar, alienated communities because of the withdrawal of services and less effective 
prevention and more crisis management. Additionally, the implications of a more targeted or 
target driven approach were: a greater level of bureaucracy which might be considered 
paperwork for the sake of paperwork, the quantifying of things that are naturally not 
conducive to that kind of treatment such as human interaction and support through 
conversation; excessive measurement of results, progress and investment versus return 
analysis and so on. There was also impact on the workload of Children’s Centre workers 
where the demands of measurable data production drew them away from what matters most; 
engagement with the children and families in their communities. 
 
The change of emphasis from core offer to core purpose was also entirely compatible with 
the imposition of austerity measures. Austerity caused Children’s Centres to experience 
limited resources for families, forced the cessation of some services, and there were 
redundancies in staff teams. This in turn disrupted the stability of communities as familiar 
trusted faces disappeared from centres and were not replaced. The change from core offer to 
core purpose also changed the discourse from centres having potentially vague outcomes, 
albeit successfully achieved, to them delivering identified outputs through purposefully 
targeted services. This position was more in keeping with the suggested political ideology of 
the coalition government that arguably wanted to see some measurable results for the money 
they were spending. One direct manifestation of this, although quietly abandoned, was the 
idea of Children’s Centres being paid by result. This concept of payment by result was given 
new life with the Troubled Families agenda (Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG, 2012). This suggests that political ideology rather than financial 
austerity appeared to be the main driver behind the change from core offer to core purpose.  
 
Since the middle of 2000, the ideals of universal services that aimed to support but not 
stigmatise children and families were promoted by labour politicians. The Conservative party 
had long been ambivalent towards certain vulnerable groups in society. Margaret Thatcher 
had `disapproved of those so lazy, feckless or lacking in self-respect that they were content to 
live in subsidised housing or on benefits’ (Campbell, 2003: 248). This view was tempered 
under the leadership of Cameron (coalition government) which recognised ‘the importance of 
softening the Party’s approach towards those experiencing poverty and disadvantage’ (Page, 
2010:11). This did not prevent the universal approach of Children’s Centres turning into a 
targeted and, by implication, stigmatising approach for families in need and hard to reach. In 
fact, some of these families found themselves rebranded as ‘Troubled Families’ with the 
arrival of the Troubled Families agenda (DCLG, 2015). 
 
This was the pinnacle of a fundamental change in the way those in need in society were 
viewed. This position was fraught with danger. The potential for discontent and withdrawal 
amongst families was released because of the stigma attached to their ‘need’ or socio-
economic status. In effect they lost the ability to self-refer any more. A feeling of reluctance 
to seek help voluntarily was fostered in some families because they perceived someone was 
already out there aiming to get them. The core purpose resulted in a uni-directional approach 
towards hard to reach families as opposed to a core offer for families who found it difficult to 
engage which provided a reciprocal and bi-directional approach. What seems apparent still in 
2017, is that the government is unsure about the direction and purpose of Children’s Centres.  
Point for reflection 
• Can all that has been invested in and through Children’s Centres still sustain 
communities?  
 
Children’s Centres: The Beginning of the End  
The cause of change to Children’s Centres appears to be a simple one. The change of the 
United Kingdom government in 2010 saw the implementation of a range of austerity 
measures to reduce public spending. These austerity measures were suggested to be having a 
damaging impact on the poorest and most vulnerable in society in part because of ‘cuts to 
social security and public services’ (Poinasamy, 2013:2). The effects of funding cuts to a 
range of services, was that Children’s Centres started to work together in groups or clusters 
(Ofsted, 2014). The approach of clustering centres presented challenges. One of them was 
that inspection grades were typically lower than those of stand-alone centres. There could 
have been a variety of factors for this difference in performance including centre teams taking 
time to adjust to new ways of working, or that management of groups of centres was just not 
as effective as one centre with one manager. The implications for children and families seem, 
however, clear: poorer quality services. 
 
What seems apparent is that this pattern of changes had implications beyond the quality of 
service provision or the preservation of services such as centre usage by families, and 
Children’s Centre workers’ well-being. Although registrations with centres by families were 
high, there was an emerging pattern of decline in families attending centres which negates the 
original purpose of Children Centres. The act of clustering centres also had a negative effect 
on staffing which was disproportionately represented by managerial roles. Goff et al. (2013: 
26), for example, identified the apprehension Children’s Centre managers had about the 
effects these changes would have on their future roles, ‘particularly with the possible removal 
of middle management posts at centre level in favour of a higher managerial control over 
several sites’. This potential loss of onsite and often very experienced managers was also 
problematic at a functional level; the problem being a lower quality provision for children 
and families. The suggested and generally accepted link between high quality leadership and 
the provision of high quality services for children was being broken with the loss of certain 
managerial positions in centres, the impact on services appeared to be immediate and 
devastating.  
 
Royston and Rodrigues (2013) suggest that Children’s Centres were working as part of ‘a 
broad safety net’ of services for families.  The emerging problem was that this safety net was 
disappearing. Centres were either reducing opening hours, the amount and variety of 
available sessions or both. This was being compounded by the loss of expert and experienced 
staff. In some LAs, senior roles in Children’s Centres started to disappear.  Children’s Centre 
teachers, for example, were typically part of the senior leadership team planning the direction 
of the educational strategies centres provided. These types of role were crucial to effective 
service provision and to the families in the community. Their loss reduced centres abilities to 
provide ‘quality first’ teaching approaches and to develop parent partnerships by involving 
parents in their child’s education through a qualified professional. The damaging effects of 
this type of reorganisation were even more telling when considered in relation to other 
Children’s Centre staff such as Family Support Workers. They are vital for the way services 
are provided, so the argument goes that knowledgeable staff provide good services and if 
they are lost in a reorganisation process, then services to children and families will suffer 
(Lewis, et al., 2011).  
 
One of the consequences of clustering centres discussed earlier was the loss of daily contact 
with fellow workers and the ‘casual’ conversations about families of shared interest or 
concern. In some instances the ability to hold regular team meetings had become more 
problematic for Centres, in effect reducing the opportunities for effective communication. 
What poor communication in organisational change suggests, is a culture of poor change 
management. The culture of poor change management may, for example, go some way to 
explaining  the decline in Ofsted inspection outcomes for Children’s Centres that had 
changed from a stand-alone model of working to a cluster model of working during this 
period. How change was managed, or as in this case not, produces a domino effect that goes 
something like:  
• Poor communication gives rise to disaffected staff who felt undervalued. 
• Undervalued staff also become uncertain about their future prospects.  
• Undervalued and disaffected staff teams do not perform as effectively. 
• Ofsted inspections happened at a time when these staff teams were underperforming. 
• The result is poorer services and potential outcomes for children and families. 
 
In addition, at that time of change some Children’s Centre workers reported there was a lack 
of recognition for what Children’s Centres did or what workers provided by way of 
supporting children and their communities. The message from government, although not 
explicit, did imply that Children’s Centre were not valued and by association neither was 
their workforce.  
Points for reflection 
• If Centres were valued then why did the government remove the ring fence from their 
Early Intervention Grant funding leaving them exposed to budget cuts by Local 
Authorities?  
• If they were valued why consult about their purpose (Gymiah, 2015)?  
Tragically, as always, the biggest losers in any of these scenarios are children and families 
who are stuck in the middle of these imposed changes at a time when, arguably, they needed 
support more than ever.  
 
There is also a case to be made that LAs were making organisational changes to Children’s 
Centres, with clustering, in an attempt to save them in one form or another. This point was 
articulated by Rallings who considered that through a process of reorganising Children’s 
Centres into groups or clusters LAs were able `to protect services despite reduced funding’ 
because of the financial savings they could make (2014:5). There also appeared to be explicit 
steps taken by LAs to target their spending on more disadvantaged communities by 
‘prioritising resources for Children’s Centres serving the neediest groups’ (Sammons et al., 
2015:17). Reporting in December 2015, Sammons et al. identified that some Children’s 
Centres located in the more disadvantaged areas were protected from the more severe LA 
cuts or at least subject to less cutting than other Children’s Centres. This allowed the LAs that 
were the subject of the report to provide for those families most in need. The core purpose for 
Children’s Centres should also be considered as another factor in LAs decisions to restructure 
and reorganise Children’s Centres. This was so LAs could focus the dispersed skill set of 
workers to meet the key aim of the core purpose, which was to provide a more targeted 
approach to services for vulnerable children and families. This approach found parallels with 
the governments Troubled Families agenda (DCLG, 2011) (discussed earlier), which aims to 
provide targeted intervention programmes for families with multiple problems (from crime 
and anti-social behaviour through unemployment or domestic abuse to mental health issues 
(Bate, 2017).   
 
Whilst the core purpose was compatible with the Troubled Families agenda it did not appear 
to be compatible with Children’s Centre workers’ perceptions of what Children’s Centres 
should be providing. A National Children’s Bureau (2013) survey of practitioners and 
families portrays a dominant view (an overwhelming 80%) that Children’s Centres should 
have universal access ‘but should work hard to bring in disadvantaged families’. Only 1% 
thought centres should be exclusively for disadvantaged families (Ransom, 2014).  
Point for Reflection 
• Did the government deliberately intend that Children’s Centres should become such a 
key part of the delivery of the Troubled Families agenda?   
    
The position Children’s Centres still find themselves in at the time of writing this chapter 
suggests that financial austerity is still the key catalyst for the changes Children’s Centres and 
their communities face.  This also raises the question of waste: were Children’s Centres a 
worthwhile investment as they were subsequently not sustained? The current inability to 
sustain Children’s Centres could also be regarded as counterproductive. The irony is that as a 
result of Government austerity and social policy, Children’s Centres and their services are 
needed more not less by many communities.         
 
Conclusion 
The sad decline of Children’s Centres is observable through a range of phenomena such as 
organisational change caused by austerity and political ideology. Yet, in simple terms, the 
jaws of austerity started to bite hard and Children’s Centre services started to suffer. 
Austerity was the starting point but Children’s Centres became the victim of a range of other 
complicating factors that hastened their demise as a universal service. These factors include 
an inability to effectively capture organisational change and poor change management by 
LAs, political ideology and measurable outcomes.  
 
The problem of effectively capturing positive outcomes for families was a significant 
challenge for Centres right from their inception. It took a long time to demonstrate clear 
outcomes and some centres never achieved this. The time and effort expended by Children’s 
Centre workers to support positive outcomes for children and families was often overlooked.  
Some of the results they achieved as one Children’s Centre worker in 2016 suggested, could 
not be “actually put down on paper”. This presented a fundamental issue for the 
substantiating what outcomes Children’s Centres achieve and the subsequent valuing of 
Children’s Centre workforce. This inability to measure outcomes was influential in the 
government’s decision to direct the change from a core offer of services to a core purpose for 
Children’s Centres. In the midst of all this families and communities suffered as they were at 
the mercy of the political agenda. 
 
There were measurable outcomes produced by Children’s Centres including: the simple 
registering of families attending centres, through to increasing breastfeeding rates in their 
communities or children achieving a good level of development in relation to the ages and 
stages identified in the Early Years Foundation Stage (EYFS) (Early Education, 2014). Then 
there were the softer outcomes such as the role modelling of appropriate child interactions 
that went on in centre sessions, case studies of successful interventions with children and 
families or the qualitative testimonials from families about how centres had helped or 
changed their lives. The results of Children’s Centres work were arguably always going to be 
long term, possibly ephemeral and anecdotal. These soft outcomes should have been 
considered just as valuable as those more measurable hard outcomes to show a significant 
change, but how you capture their effect is, to this day, an ongoing challenge. 
  
Children’s Centres often worked as safety nets for some families, some families dipped in 
and out of Children’s Centres at times of crisis or need, others engaged on their own terms. 
The hard evidence of measurable outcomes for this type of support for families is almost 
impossible to establish. How do you capture the benefits of a centre worker talking to a 
depressed mother and seeing her through a time of anxiety? Just imagine if that mother’s 
child was taken into care because there was no centre worker for the mother to go to and she 
had a breakdown? Children’s Centres could generally provide anecdotal evidence of their 
impact and with ‘what if’ scenarios, but they could not  be presented as convincingly as, for 
example, having supported six members of workless households back into work, providing an 
evidenced return on the government’s investment.  
 
A government’s investment in early prevention or more currently early intervention 
programmes such as Children’s Centres can be effective in financial terms. The ethos of early 
prevention was more consistent with the core offer and universal services. There was an 
understanding that aiming to give all children the best possible start in life would ‘help to 
ensure that children, particularly those at risk of social exclusion are ready to learn when they 
arrive at school’ (Her Majesty’s Treasury, 1998:14). This role for effective early prevention 
was further supported because the implications of not doing so could be catastrophic. These 
could be life limiting factors such as poor health and environmental deprivation for children 
plus the added financial cost that brings to the government. This financial burden for the 
government continues with the knock on effects these factors can have as those children 
become adults (Field, 2010; Marmot, 2010; Allen, 2011). The inability to measure softer 
outcomes could be less problematic for Children’s Centres if they were genuinely viewed by 
government as an investment for and in children in all aspects of the work they undertook. 
Children’s Centres, that were valued for working as a safety net or providing a listening ear 
in programmes of preventative and outcome enhancing services, successfully supported the 
community to raise their children.  
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